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For most of the last 50 years, to promote a safe banking 
system, the U.S. Congress has imposed interest rate 
ceilings on bank deposits. Federal legislation passed in 
the wake of the 1930s banking crisis prohibited banks 
from paying any interest on checking accounts and 
authorized the Federal Reserve Board of Governors to 
set upper limits on the rates banks could offer on time 
and savings accounts. The rationale for these ceilings 
appeared straightforward. If banks were not allowed to 
compete for deposits through interest rates, they would 
not be forced to invest in the high-yield, high-risk end 
of their portfolio opportunities. Limiting what banks 
could pay to their depositors, in other words, would 
limit the amount of yield they would need to earn and 
hence the amount of risk they would need to bear to be 
competitive. Without rate competition, that is, the 
chances of repeating the 1930s banking crisis would be 
reduced. 
By 1980, however, the deposit rate ceilings had ap-
parently become more costly than they were worth. The 
general rise in market rates in the 1970s made bank 
deposits subject to rate ceilings considerably less 
attractive than competing instruments offered at 
market rates by other financial institutions. Late in the 
1970s, this competition began to raise concerns about 
the viability of the traditional bank deposit. Further-
more, the rationale for deposit ceilings had been 
attacked. Studies done in the 1960s found that before 
U.S. bank deposit rates were regulated there was little 
relationship between these rates and bank risk-taking; 
that is, contrary to what had been thought in the 1930s, 
there was no benefit to regulating deposit rates. Con-
sequently, in 1980 Congress decided to eliminate most 
deposit rate ceilings, phasing them out over several 
years. 
I am not questioning here whether Congress made 
the right decision. With market rates on the rise, 
existing deposit ceilings may very well have threatened 
the viability of bank deposits. I am questioning, though, 
the research result that unregulated deposit rates and 
bank risk are not related. The result is unexpected 
because it is inconsistent with modern finance theory's 
prediction that, in general, risk and return are positively 
correlated. The result is also suspect, and needs re-
examination, because the studies which found it, while 
perhaps the best available in the 1960s, were limited in 
critical ways. 
A not-so-limited reexamination became possible 
recently when I found new and better data on banking 
in the 1920s. Specifically, I found bank examination 
records dating back to the mid-1920s which give 
researchers better measures of deposit rates than they 
have had before. Studying the 1920s with these new 
data, I find the positive correlation between deposit 
rates and bank risk that modern finance theory predicts. 
This new result, of course, does not necessarily imply 
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that deposit rate ceilings are the best or even a very 
effective way to control bank risk. Nevertheless, it does 
suggest that ceilings are, after all, potential tools to do 
that. And policymakers may want all the regulatory 
tools they can get to maintain safety in a banking 
system that in many other ways is being deregulated. 
Successful Attacks on Deposit Rate Ceilings 
In the 1960s, two major studies were published that 
seriously challenged the long-standing rationale for 
deposit rate ceilings. Again, the rationale was that, with 
rates unrestricted, bank risk and bank deposit rates are 
positively correlated, so bank risk can be regulated by 
regulating deposit rates. Thirty years after deposit 
ceilings were imposed, however, studies using the best 
available data on banking in the 1920s could not find 
the hypothesized correlation. And some 20 years later, 
based in part on this result, deposit ceilings began to be 
removed. 
A Little History 
The view that there is a correlation between how much 
risk a bank takes on and how much it has to pay for its 
deposits goes back almost 130 years, to a time well 
before rate ceilings were actually imposed. (See Cox 
1966, chap. 1.) The essence of the argument is captured 
in a statement issued by the New York Clearinghouse in 
1858, when it first proposed to regulate its members' 
deposit rates (quoted in Cox 1966, p.3): 
A bank, having committed this first error of paying interest 
on its deposits, is therefore compelled by the necessities of 
its position to take the second false step and expand its 
operations beyond all prudent bounds. 
This view persisted throughout the 19th century and 
into the 20th, but didn't lead to nationwide mandatory 
ceilings until after the worst banking crisis in U.S. 
history. Between 1858 and 1933, clearinghouses tried 
several times to regulate bank deposits. In this period, 
the New York Clearinghouse adopted some voluntary 
ceilings, but they were short-lived. Regulatory bills 
were also discussed and introduced in Congress, but 
none were even voted on. After a series of massive bank 
failures and closings in the early 1930s, however, 
Congress felt it had to intervene directly to create a 
safer banking system. Among several safety features in 
the Banking Act of 1933 was an amendment to the 
Federal Reserve Act that prohibited banks from paying 
interest on checkable (demand) deposits and autho-
rized the Federal Reserve to regulate rates on time and 
savings deposits (quoted in Cox 1966, p.24): 
No member bank shall directly or indirectly, by any device 
whatsoever, pay an interest on any deposit which is 
payable on demand The Federal Reserve Board shall 
from time to time limit by regulation the rate of interest 
which may be paid by member banks on time deposits. 
Two Heavy Blows 
Were these ceilings justified? Is there, in fact, a 
correlation between bank rates and bank risk? These 
were the questions asked by two separate studies in the 
1960s. They both tried to measure the correlation for 
banking in the 1920s, the decade before the ceilings 
were imposed. And they both answered both questions 
no. 
To estimate the correlation, Albert Cox (1966) used 
data available on a sample of national, or federally 
chartered, banks. Cox began with a sample of 285 
national banks in the District of Columbia and in four 
states (Michigan, Missouri, Oregon, and Vermont) from 
a total population of roughly 8,000 national banks in 
1929. He chose this year because not until then were 
detailed financial records of these banks available. 
For this sample, Cox constructed a proxy for the 
deposit rate, because the rate was not listed on these 
records, and he considered a dozen different measures 
of asset quality, or risk. His deposit rate proxy was the 
ratio of the amount of interest paid on total deposits to 
the amount of total deposits. He found that this ratio 
ranged from zero to 5 percent, with the ratio of three-
quarters of the banks falling between 1 and 3 percent. 
To measure asset quality, Cox settled on these four 
ratios: 
• Gross losses on earning assets to earning assets. 
• Real estate loans to earning assets. 
• Securities other than those of the U.S. government 
to earning assets. 
• Interest received to earning assets. 
The presumption was—and still is—that the higher 
these ratios, the lower the quality of the bank's assets 
and so the higher its risk. Gross losses on earning assets 
are considered indicators of troubled assets. Real estate 
loans are viewed as riskier loans on average than short-
term commercial loans. Securities other than those of 
the U.S. government are, of course, riskier than U.S. 
government securities. And interest received is gen-
erally higher the riskier the investment. 
Cox also divided banks into four size classes based 
3 on the amount of their time deposits. This was nec-
essary because time deposit rates are higher than de-
mand deposit rates. A bank's ratio of time deposits to 
total deposits will thus obviously affect the deposit rate 
proxy, the ratio of total interest to total deposits. 
Within these four classifications, Cox estimated 
correlations between the deposit rate proxy and the four 
risk measures. He calculated 16 correlation coefficients 
for a subsample of 82 national banks for the year 1929. 
He found that only two of these coefficients were 
positive and statistically significant (different from 
zero). The group of banks with time deposits from 40 to 
60 percent of their total deposits had significant 
positive coefficients between the deposit rate and gross 
losses and the deposit rate and real estate loans. None of 
the other 14 coefficients were significant. He thus 
concluded that no significant correlation between bank 
rates and bank risk existed. 
George Benston (1964) addressed the same issue 
using an additional body of data and an improved 
deposit rate proxy—and got a similar result. 
Benston first used data on 412 New York State 
banks (95 percent of all New York State banks outside 
of New York City) during the period 1923-34. The 
data (collected by the New York State banking depart-
ment for selected years) included amounts of bank 
earnings, expenses, and losses as well as of their 
standard asset and liability accounts. Benston com-
pared the percentage of gross earnings paid out as 
interest (his proxy for the deposit rate) to gross interest 
and other funds received per $100 of loans and 
securities (his measure of asset quality, or risk) for the 
years 1923,1926, and 1929. He found little correlation. 
Thus, he concluded that this evidence is not consistent 
with the view that, before deposit ceilings were im-
posed, banks that paid high rates on deposits invested 
in riskier portfolios. 
Benston recognized, however, a potential problem 
with this analysis. Like Cox's, his interest rate proxy 
was a proxy for the average rate paid on all deposits 
rather than a rate paid on a specific deposit. Averaging 
over different deposit types, Benston realized, could 
bias the estimates of the correlation between bank rates 
and bank risk. Consequently, he turned to a data base 
that did not go back as many years as the New York 
State banking data, but did contain interest paid on 
demand deposits separate from interest on other de-
posits. This was data published by the U.S. Comptroller 
of the Currency in its annual reports. These reports are 
available for all national banks and beginning in 1927 
contain earning and expense reports that have interest 
paid on demand deposits separate from other interest 
payments. (Before 1927 only the total interest paid was 
reported.) 
With this data Benston estimated the rate paid on 
demand deposits along with a dozen different measures 
of bank risk for the years 1928, 1931, and 1932. His 
interest rate proxy was the ratio of total interest paid on 
demand deposits to total demand deposits. His bank 
risk variables included four measures of gross earnings, 
two measures of investments as percentages of total 
assets, and six measures of losses and loans and 
securities. Benston grouped banks by location and 
examined banks located in reserve cities separately 
from banks located elsewhere. Consequently, cities, 
rather than banks, became his observations, and the 
question thus became, Do cities that have banks that on 
average offer the higher rates on demand deposits also 
have banks that are riskier? 
Computing simple correlation coefficients between 
interest paid on deposits and bank risk variables, 
Benston found either a negative correlation or no 
correlation at all. For example, in all three years and for 
all four earnings variables, he found that the higher the 
earnings, the lower the rate paid on demand deposits. 
Both Cox and Benston drew the obvious implication 
from their results: Since deposit rates are not correlated 
with bank risk, regulating them will not regulate bank 
risk. 
Capitulation 
By 1980 Congress apparently agreed with Cox and 
Benston. Over the years, the Federal Reserve had raised 
deposit rate ceilings on bank time and savings accounts 
several times to keep up with market rates, but by the 
mid-1970s those actions were clearly not enough. 
Market rates were rising so fast that nonbank financial 
institutions not covered by rate ceilings were bidding 
significant amounts of funds away from commercial 
banks. By the end of the 1970s Congress, concerned 
about the survival of the traditional bank deposit, began 
hearings on the possibility of eliminating deposit rate 
ceilings. The costs of these ceilings were well-docu-
mented during the hearings, and both the Cox and 
Benston studies were cited as evidence that the ceilings 
were not an effective way to control bank risk (U.S. 
Congress 1979, pp. 164,201). Based on these hearings, 
Congress voted to phase out most deposit ceilings over 
a five-year period. Today banks are only prohibited 
from paying interest on the traditional type of demand 
deposit, which basically only includes deposits held by 
businesses. 
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A Counterattack 
Again, Congress' decision to eliminate most deposit 
rate ceilings, because they jeopardized the competitive 
position of banking, is not in question here. What is in 
question is the result of studies that recommended 
removal of ceilings, the result that there was no 
correlation between bank rates and bank risk. The 
result is suspect for both methodological and theo-
retical reasons. A reexamination of banking in the 
1920s made possible by some recently discovered 
historical data suggests that such skepticism is 
warranted. 
Cause for Suspicion 
The Cox and Benston studies are both open to criticism 
because of the limited way these researchers chose to 
use the data that were available in the 1960s. Cox, for 
example, began with a sample of 285 national banks. 
Yet when he estimated the correlations between his 
deposit rate proxy and various measures of risk, he only 
used 82 of those banks. Similarly, Benston effectively 
threw out some of his data when he chose to group 
banks by city. This averaging hides any correlation 
among banks within a city. 
Both researchers also failed to consider multivariate 
correlations. Both implicitly assumed there was no 
covariance among the various risk measures. While 
that may or may not have been a good assumption (I 
doubt it was), it is a testable assumption and should 
have been tested. 
These methodological criticisms, though, are not as 
serious as a data limitation that both Cox and Benston 
faced. Not having explicit data on rates paid by banks, 
they had to construct an interest rate proxy from data on 
bank income and earnings reports and balance sheets. 
In general, their common proxy was the ratio of the 
amount of interest paid to the amount of total deposits. 
Such a proxy effectively involves averaging deposit 
rates over time and maturities, a procedure that can 
easily bias an estimate of the true deposit rate and any 
correlation that might exist between bank rates and 
risk. 
Cox used a proxy for interest paid on all deposits and 
so was averaging across different types of deposits as 
well as over time. To see how averaging across deposits 
can affect the estimate of the correlation between bank 
rates and risk, consider a very risky bank that can only 
sell short-term time certificates and a very safe bank 
that can sell much longer term certificates. With an 
upward-sloping yield curve—that is, with long rates 
higher than short rates (as was true for most of the 
1920s)—Cox's rate proxy could easily be negatively 
correlated with bank risk even though the true correla-
tion is positive. 
Benston tried to improve on the rate proxy by 
constructing one related to interest paid on demand 
deposits only, thus avoiding averaging across different 
deposits. Nevertheless, like Cox, he still averaged over 
time, and this type of averaging can be misleading if 
deposits vary erratically between averaging dates. 
Benston's proxy is the ratio of interest paid on demand 
deposits to total demand deposits. It is calculated by 
dividing the total interest paid between reporting dates 
by the average level of deposits in that period (end total 
less beginning total divided by two). Suppose deposits 
were growing over most of the period and interest was 
being paid accordingly, but then deposits declined 
precipitously just before the reporting date. The rate of 
interest paid on demand deposits in this example would 
clearly be overstated by Benston's proxy and would 
affect any estimate of the deposit rate/risk correlation. 
These limitations alone raise doubts about the Cox 
and Benston result of no correlation between bank rates 
and bank risk. But even if these limitations were not 
serious, economists should find the Cox and Benston 
result disturbing because it is inconsistent with modern 
finance theory. The traditional rationale for deposit rate 
ceilings can be viewed as part of a more general theory 
that says rates offered on an investment and the 
riskiness of that investment generally are positively 
correlated. Applied to banking, that means that, accord-
ing to modern finance theory, banks in the 1920s that 
took on riskier assets should have had to pay depositors 
higher rates. That the Cox and Benston studies did not 
find this implies that either an otherwise well-supported 
theory is now in doubt or those studies are and banking 
in the 1920s needs to be reexamined. 
Another Look 
A better examination of this period is now possible 
because of my recent discovery of more complete bank 
records from the 1920s. Unlike previously available 
records, these explicitly list the rates banks paid on their 
deposits as well as the dollar amounts on which those 
rates were paid. Thus, proxies are no longer necessary: 
a much better measure of the unregulated rates banks 
paid on deposits is now available. 
• The Data and the Sample 
My digging uncovered 1920s examination reports for 
some banks in the New York Federal Reserve District. 
These records have been stored at the Federal Reserve 
5 Bank of New York in some old file cabinets that had 
been locked and apparently unopened since the mid-
19308.
1 Since its establishment in 1913, the Federal 
Reserve System has been responsible for examining all 
state-chartered banks that choose to become Fed 
members. (Federally chartered banks, which are re-
quired to join the System, are examined by the Comp-
troller of the Currency.) Fortunately, the original 1920s 
examination records—for the New York Federal 
Reserve District, at least—still exist in reasonably good 
condition. 
For this study, I chose to limit the sample of banks to 
state-chartered banks located in New York City, for 
two reasons. One is that, in the 1920s, even more so 
than today, New York City was considered the financial 
center of the United States. Thus, if there are statistical 
regularities to uncover in banking, they should be re-
flected in the records of these banks. The other reason 
to focus on New York City banks is that confining the 
sample to a single market, where all sample banks are 
assumed to be competing for the same deposits, reduces 
the possibility of deposit rate variation being caused by 
differences in local economic conditions rather than 
differences in bank risk-taking. 
The New York Fed examiner's old reports of 
condition (a sample of which is in Appendix A) include 
several tables relevant for this study. The first pages of 
each report list the standard balance sheet items for 
assets and liabilities, given at both book and allowed 
(market) value. The balance sheets are followed by a 
table of the collateral of secured loans and a table of 
doubtful investments in securities. The last formal page 
of the report includes a list of officer names, positions, 
and salaries; a table of earnings and charges since the 
last examination; a table of dividends declared over the 
year; and, finally, a table of the deposit rates and 
amounts paid at each rate. Again, it's this last table that 
has not previously been available to researchers. And I 
doubt anyone was aware that such data were collected 
by examiners during this period.
2 
My sample banks, then, are the state-chartered New 
York City member banks for which these examination 
reports are available for the years 1926-30. (For a list 
of the sample banks and the specific month and year 
each report was made, see Appendix B.) I limit the study 
to these five years partly to keep the study manageable 
and partly because the years just before the banking 
crisis of the 1930s would likely show a correlation if it 
existed. I divide bank reports into subperiods because 
the observations can be viewed as coming from both a 
time series population and a cross-section population. 
In other words, since most banks were examined more 
than once between 1926 and 1930, I can compare 
banks both across time and at a point in time. The dates 
of the subperiods are somewhat arbitrary because the 
examination process was ongoing; subperiods are de-
fined so that no bank has two reports in any sub-
period. I have three subperiods: from February 1926 to 
April 1928, from May 1928 to April 1929, and from 
May 1929 to November 1930. The total number of 
banks in the sample is 46, but since not all were 
examined in each subperiod, the subperiod totals are 
smaller: 39 for the first and 27 for the second and third. 
Although the sample banks are from the same 
market, they are quite diverse, according to some 
standard measures. Bank size, as measured by total 
assets, varies from as small as $ 1.6 million to as large as 
$1.5 billion. The size distribution is quite skewed, 
though, with half the banks smaller than $40 million. 
Capital-to-asset ratios vary considerably, too: from 
5.7 percent to over 50 percent. Here, again, the distri-
bution is skewed to the small end, with half the banks 
having capital-to-asset ratios less than 14 percent. 
Loan-to-deposit ratios range from close to zero to over 
200 percent, although most ratios are between 30 and 
90 percent. Given the variability in loan-to-deposit 
ratios, it is not surprising that the liquid asset-to-deposit 
ratios are also variable; they range from 4.5 to 80 
percent. (Here liquid assets are the sum of the first four 
items under assets in the report of condition: cash on 
hand, funds due from the Federal Reserve Bank, 
exchanges and demand cash items, and other items in 
cash.) 
• Deposit Rates and Risk 
The critical variables for this study are deposit rates. 
But for which deposits are the rates on these reports? 
The old table of rates paid identifies only the amount 
found these New York bank examination reports in a sub-basement of 
the New York Fed. A sample report is in Appendix A. At the request of the New 
York Fed, I have kept the bank examination ratings confidential, so the bank's 
name and other identifying characteristics do not appear on this report. 
2 After the formal report, which also includes a complete list of the bank's 
security holdings (not shown in Appendix A), are two pages of notes written by 
the examiner. The first of these contains the initial estimates of assets and 
liabilities, a breakdown of capital and surplus, and a summary of criticized 
assets. The second, more interesting page contains the examiner's remarks on 
the well-being of the bank. This page contains information analogous to the 
more formal CAMEL rating the examiners construct today. (CAMEL stands 
for capital, assets, management, earnings, and liquidity—the five broad areas 
on which bank examiners formally grade banks and determine an overall 
quantitative ranking.) This information was not used in this study because these 
reports were confidential when they were made, so the examiner's remarks 
should not have affected the public's assessment of the riskiness of banks. 
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Table 1 
Evidence of Public Concern About Bank Safety in 1926-30: 
A Bank Deposit Rate vs. A Safe Rate 
Sample Period 




Average Rate on 
Sample Bank* 3-6 Month U.S. 
Passbook Accounts Govt. Securities 
Rate 
Difference 
(Bank less U.S.) 
Feb. 1926-Apr. 1928  28  3.7%  3.2%  .5% pts. 
May 1928-Apr. 1929  18  3.8  4.3  -.5 
May 1929-Nov. 1930  20  4.0  3.3  .7 
Feb. 1926-Nov. 1930  66  3.8%  3.5%  .3% pts. 
*The sample banks are state-chartered Federal Reserve member banks in New York City in 1926-30. 
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, U.S. Treasury Department 
paid, not the type of deposit. Nevertheless, for one rate, I 
can identify the type of deposit with a high degree of 
confidence. Turn to the examiner's report of condition 
in Appendix A. On line 14 of its page 2 appears the item 
"deposits withdrawable only on presentation of pass-
books." The amount on this line virtually matches the 
amount corresponding to the 4 percent deposit rate in 
the interest rate table on page 4 of the report.
3 
The passbook rate varies across the sample banks, so 
there is something to explain. Among these banks, the 
passbook rate ranges from 2.5 percent to 5 percent. The 
coefficient of dispersion (the standard deviation of the 
passbook rate divided by its mean) is 13 percent for the 
entire sample period and about the same for each 
subperiod. The key question, then, is this: Can the 
variation in the passbook rate be explained by variation 
in the risk characteristics of banks? 
Before this question is addressed, however, another 
should be: Were banks that were members of the 
Federal Reserve System in the 1920s perceived to be 
risky? Some economists have asserted that during this 
time the public thought that the safety of member bank 
deposits was guaranteed by the Federal Reserve.
4 If this 
is true, then looking for a correlation between bank 
rates and risk is a waste of time. If bank deposits were 
considered safe, as most are today, then any rate 
variance would have nothing to do with banks' risk 
characteristics—indeed, it would explain why Cox and 
Benston couldn't find such a correlation. 
To look for evidence of public concern about bank 
safety, I compare the average sample bank passbook 
rate to a safe rate in the same period. To represent the 
safe rate, I choose the average short-term (three-to-six 
month) U.S. government security rate. Table 1 shows 
this comparison for the total 1926-30 period and for 
each subperiod identified above. The table also shows 
the number of banks that offered a passbook account 
during these years. Notice that over the total period the 
passbook rate was 30 basis points higher than the safe 
rate. Although it was 50 basis points lower than the safe 
rate in the second subperiod, it was 50 basis points 
31 could also have identified rates on deposits subject to check. The 
checking account, though, does not appear to have been as uniform as the 
passbook account. In the examiner's report in Appendix A, 2 percent looks like 
the rate paid on a checking account. However, the amount of deposits subject to 
check (on line 10 of the report's page 2) was more than 65 percent greater than 
the amount of deposits on which 2 percent interest was paid. I suspect that many 
checking accounts had better terms than the 2 percent account, but paid no 
interest. This makes estimating a demand deposit rate much harder than 
estimating a passbook rate. The latter isn't exactly easy, though. While 
passbook accounts may not have varied within a bank, the way interest was 
computed on these accounts did vary considerably across banks. According to a 
study by the American Bankers Association (1929), in the 1920s banks had at 
least 52 different methods of computing interest on passbook accounts. 
4John Kareken and Neil Wallace (1978, p. 414), for example, make this 
claim: 
In the years to 1934 [prior to FDIC insurance] there were several banking panics. But 
the last of those panics, that of 1930-33, causes us no difficulty. For the Federal Reserve 
was intended to be the lender of last resort—in effect, the insurer of bank liabilities— 
With the Federal Reserve having been created, bank creditors thought—as it happens, 
mistakenly—that bank liabilities had been made safe. 
7 higher in the first subperiod and 70 basis points higher 
in the third. 
The passbook rate being higher on average than the 
government rate suggests that the public were con-
cerned about bank safety in the 1920s.
5 Whether riskier 
banks paid higher rates of return than safer banks in the 
1920s, therefore, is a meaningful question to ask. 
• The Correlation 
To test the 1920s relationship between the passbook 
rate and some measures of bank risk (similar to Cox's 
and Benston's), I use my sample data to estimate the 
unknowns (the a's and the error term) in this regression 
model: 
Passbook Rate = a0 + ax (Capital/Total Assets) 
+ a2 (Liquid Assets/Total Deposits) 
+ a3 (Loans/Total Deposits) 
+ a4 (Log of Total Assets) 
+ a5 (Short-Term U.S. Rate) + error. 
Table 2 first lists the model's independent variables 
and the expected sign of each coefficient in the 
regression on the passbook rate under the hypothesis 
that riskier banks pay higher deposit rates.
6 Under this 
hypothesis, I expect that the higher the capital-to-asset 
ratio, the less risk for a depositor and, other things 
unchanged, the lower the deposit rate. That reasoning 
holds as well for the liquid asset-to-total deposit ratio 
(where liquid assets are reserves at the Federal Reserve, 
vault cash, and all other cash items). If loans are 
considered the riskiest assets a bank can hold, then the 
higher the loan-to-deposit ratio, the higher the deposit 
rate. The larger the bank, as measured by (the log of) 
total assets, the more it can diversify and hold a safer 
portfolio; thus, the greater the assets, the lower should 
be the deposit rate. Finally, other things unchanged, all 
banks will have to pay higher rates the higher the safe 
rate. 
I estimate this model using two techniques. One, 
ordinary least squares, assumes the error term is in-
dependently distributed. That is, it does not take into 
account that these data are both a time series and a 
cross section. Nevertheless, if the errors are close to 
being independent, estimates made by this technique 
may be a good approximation of the true estimates. To 
take account of the expected dependence of the errors, 
though, I also use the Fuller-Battese (1974) technique. 
This is a generalized least squares estimator designed 
for data that are generated across time and space. 
As Table 2 shows, the results based on the ordinary 
least squares estimator suggest a fairly strong correla-
tion between the passbook rate and the risk variables. 
Three of the four risk measure coefficients are statis-
tically significant, and all three have their expected 
signs. Only the loan-to-deposit ratio has the wrong 
sign, and it is not statistically significant. At 0.49, the R
2, 
the proportion of the passbook rate variation explained 
by the independent variables, is generally considered 
acceptable for regressions using cross-section data. 
And the F-value, the result of a test of the significance 
of the risk variables only, is impressive. (Note that the 
safe rate coefficient is not statistically significant in this 
equation. Presumably, this reflects the fact that the rate 
did not change enough over the sample period to affect 
the supply of or demand for passbook accounts.) 
The results based on the Fuller-Battese estimator 
also show a strong correlation between the passbook 
rate and the risk variables. In this regression, the 
coefficients of all four risk variables are appropriately 
signed, and two of the coefficients—those for the 
capital-to-asset ratio and total assets—are significant. 
(Again, that for the safe rate is not.) 
In summary, contrary to past research, statistical 
tests using better bank deposit rate data do find a 
5 The difference between these rates probably underestimates that concern. 
For consider passbook accounts today. Thanks to deposit insurance, these are 
perfectly safe accounts, up to $100,000, and they pay rates significantly below 
the government rate. Since March 1986, the rate ceiling on savings accounts 
has been eliminated and the Federal Reserve Board has been surveying a 
sample of U.S. banks on the rates paid on such accounts. These data show that 
from April 1986 through April 1987 the average savings account rate paid by 
all insured commercial banks was 5.29 percent (FR Board 1986-87). Over the 
same period, the three-month Treasury bill rate averaged 5.64 percent, or 35 
basis points higher than the passbook rate. Since both investments are safe, the 
35 basis point difference is a measure of the liquidity value of a passbook 
account. Treasury bills are only available today in $10,000 denominations, 
while passbook accounts are available in any amount up to $100,000 for 
insured accounts. The extra 35 basis points are what investors require to take on 
equally safe but less liquid assets. 
The 1980s liquidity value of a passbook account can be used to estimate 
how concerned the 1920s public were about bank safety. In the 1920s, like 
today, Treasury bills were issued in large denominations (approximately 
$10,000-$ 15,000 in today's dollars). If passbook accounts were also con-
sidered safe then and the cost of providing such an account has not changed, the 
average passbook rate in the 1920s should have been roughly 35 basis points 
lower than the short-term government rate. That the average passbook rate was 
instead 30 basis points higher implies that the public needed to be compensated 
for bank risk by roughly 65 basis points. 
6The theory that risk and rate of return are correlated applies to rates 
promised or expected, whereas my data are rates actually paid. To the extent 
that rates promised and paid are different, my regressions are subject to 
measurement error. However, since none of my sample banks failed before 
1930, the rates they paid are likely the rates they promised. 
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Table 2 
Evidence of a Correlation Between Bank Deposit Rates and Risk in 1926-30t 
Coefficients (and /-values) 
Independent Variables  Expected  Estimated by 
of Regression Model  Signs of  Ordinary  Fuller-Battese 
and Summary Statistics  Coefficients  Least Squares  Technique 
Risk Measures 
Capital-to-Asset Ratio fa)  —  -.0098  -.0125  Capital-to-Asset Ratio fa) 
(-1.7)**  (-2.0)* 
Liquid Asset-to-Deposit Ratio (a2)  —  -.0207  -.0119 
(-2.5)*  (-1.34) 
Loan-to-Deposit Ratio (a3)  +  -.0030  .0003  Loan-to-Deposit Ratio (a3) 
(-1.5)  (.7) 
Log of Total Assets (a4)  —  -.0015  -.0016  Log of Total Assets (a4) 
(-3.4)*  (-3.2)* 
A Safe Rate 
3-6 Month U.S. Security Rate (a5)  +  -.0187  -.0135  3-6 Month U.S. Security Rate (a5) 
(-.31)  (-.58) 
Constant (a0)  +  .0675  .0692  Constant (a0) 
(9.4)*  (8.3)* 
Degrees of Freedom  60  60 
R2  .49  n.a. 
f-Value (from joint test of risk measures)  12.7*  n.a. 
tThe sample is state-chartered Federal Reserve member banks in New York City in 1926-30. 
^Significant at the 5% level 
** Significant at the 10% level 
n.a. - not available 
Sources of basic data: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, U.S. Treasury Department 
significant correlation between unregulated bank rates 
and bank risk, as modern finance theory predicts. 
Now What? 
What does this new finding on banking in the 1920s 
mean for banking in the 1980s? Clearly, much has 
changed in banking over those 60-odd years. Most 
deposits, for example, are now safe. Congress intro-
duced deposit insurance in 1933, which today extends 
to individual deposits up to $ 100,000. So even if deposit 
rate ceilings would have been effective in the 1920s, 
would they be today? Insured depositors do not monitor 
bank risk or require a deposit rate that reflects it. So 
there should be no correlation between the rate on 
insured deposits and bank risk for regulators to exploit. 
Further, to the extent that uninsured depositors expect 
the government to rescue a troubled bank, even rates on 
uninsured deposits may not reflect bank risk. 
Still, a case for deposit rate ceilings can be made 
today. First, some evidence exists that uninsured de-
positors do require higher deposit rates from riskier 
banks (Baer and Brewer 1986). Second, even if all 
deposits were insured, deposit rate ceilings can at least 
limit the size of banks and hence limit the amount of 
insured funds that can be invested in risky assets. A 
deposit rate ceiling tied to the government rate, for 
9 Appendix A 
Sample 1929 Examination Report 
on a New York City Bank 
example, can prevent insured banks from offering 
above-market rates to attract funds to invest in highly 
risky assets. 
However, while I can make a case for deposit rate 
ceilings, I am not necessarily advocating that they be 
reimposed. Like any attempt to regulate a price, this 
regulation can be at least partially avoided by buyers 
and sellers; the prizes, gifts, and free financial services 
that banks used to offer depositors demonstrate this. 
Also, the costs of monitoring rate ceilings could easily 
swamp their benefits. And there may be more efficient 
ways to limit bank risk. 
Nevertheless, since Congress and bank regulators 
are currently considering expanding bank powers, with 
no intention of reducing deposit insurance, they must 
continue to regulate bank risk. The modest implication 
of this study is that, contrary to what they may believe, 
regulating deposit rates is one way that can be done. 
10 ANALYSIS SENT 
11929 
TO F. R. B^htiD 
Examiner's Report of the Conbttion 
J 
of the 
at the close of business on the..  I day of. ^^ 192.9..as found upon exami-
nation made by the direction and authority of the Superintendent of Banks of the State of New York 
Location H 
By whom examined £sJUll4RlSL 
Number of assistants if any 
Cash on hand 
Doe from Federal Reserve Bank (Reserve Acct) 
Exchanges and demand cash items 
Other Items in cash 
Due from Banks & Trust Cos. (Res. Depositories) 
Due from other Banks, Trust Cos., etc. 
Due from Banks (Foreign) 
Foreign Currency on hand 
Stock and bond investments 
Loans and discounts 
Overdrafts (Domestic) 
Overdrafts (Foreign Banks, etc.) 
Bonds and mortgages 
Banking house 
Other real estate 
Furniture, fixtures and vaults 
Accrued interest entered on books 
Accrued interest not entered on bodes 
Customers liability on acceptances 

















9 an  9 fttt 






































Due New York State Savings Banks 
' Due New York State Savings and Loan Associations, Credit Unions and Land Bank 
Deposits of the State of New York 
Deposits of the Superintendent of Banks of the State of New York 
Deposits due as executor, administrator, guardian, receiver, trustee, committee or depositary — Time 
Deposits due as executor, administrator, guardian, receiver, trustee, committee, or depositary— Demand 
Deposits secured by pledge of assets StTiBfS Sjlttl 
Deposits otherwise preferred, if any 
Total amount of preferred and secured deposits (Extend in second column) 
Deposits subject to check 
Due trust companies, banks and bankers 
Time deposits, certificates and other deposits, the payment of which cannot legally be required 








Other certificates of deposit 
Deposits withdrawable only on presentation of pass-books — Time 
Deposits withdrawable only on presentation of pass-books — Demand 
Cashier's checks outstanding, including similar checks of other officers 
Certified checks 
Unpaid dividends 
Deposits in foreign currency — Time 
, „ Dtfiuiilu iu fui 1 miKf ^~f*atmh<i~ w 
Total Deposits!.. 
Bills payable, bills rediscounted or sold with agreement to repurchase 
Acceptances outstanding * 
Unused balances on letter of credit 
Mortgages on real estate owned 
Reserve for taxes and expenses 
Accrued interest entered on books 
Accrued interest not entered on books 
Unearned discount 
Accrued taxes and expenses 








1 000 000 
•0 000 
-Ksrsmrr 
1 000 000 
i 
10 44t 41 
4 609 305 40 
IT 444 4f 
s 000 
1 004 444 to 
40 44V it 
12 Call or demand loans 
Time loans 
849 88 
Past due paper 
II 01* 
I i .. .jj 
4 9T5 515 05 
45 440 14 
0 8*5 
Secured by collateral readily marketable. 
Secured by real estate mortgages or other liens on realty 
Secured by stocks and bonds of realty companies 
Secured by other collateral 
Loans to holding companies for real estate 
Purchased paper 
Paper with one or more names without collateral 
Sieurti bj teak steaks 
flo bj tills rseslvsbls 
As by sssignsA Mtoaits 












6 066 »4T m 10TAL 6 
INVESTMENTS IN SECURITIES OF DOUBTFUL VALUE OR NOT READILY MARKETABLE 
vEkftjm  BOOK VALUE  MARKET VALUE 
i j 
Where lew than $ioo per share. 



















DESCRIPTION OF BOND 
Bankers* blanket wmrmtf l»l 
•f Fid. & t*po»lt c®. tm 




Number of clerks  40 
Reserves on hand 
( Cash 
l 1 
I Deposits with F. R. B. 
With reserve agents 
[uired |  Reserves oo hand required 
Reserves permitted with agents 
Reserves on hand short 
sr 
JtMfflBll 
Their total compensation 









EARNINGS AND CHARGES SINCK LAST EXAMINATIONS SHOWN BY THB BOOKS 




Rents received from real estate 





Foreign department profits 
Profit oil securities sold 
frm.trm **«• 
94 41* 0* 
46 644 86 
DEPOSITS ON WHICH INTEREST IS PAID 
-LI-





, % . 
% 
t f60 000 
600 000 
50 000 
1 066 400 
60 000 
Total deposits on which interest is paid  4 166 400 
DIVIDENDS DECLARED DURING PRECEDING TWELVE MONTHS 
mmm 
Page 4 
CBA&CXS; , .,* „,,„„„,,,.., „jj 
Salaries paid 
Inters paujto depositors 
Other interest paid 
| Rent paid __ J 
Loss on securities sold 
Charged off on securities 
oSSed^f iSo£er ILses 
Taxes paid ^ ^^ 
Foreign department loots 
tvidepd* 
Miscellaneous 
14 Name ;' 
Date of Examination: 
ItejBjource8 
Loans and Discounts - - -
Overdrafts 
F. R* Bank Stock 
Investments -------
Furniture and Fixtures -
Banking House - - -j - - -
Other Real Estate Ow^ed « 
Due from F. R. Bank - - -












Surplus - - - - -
Undivided Profits 
Duo to Banks - -
Demand Deposits -















CAPITAL AND SURPLUS 
Total Surplus, Profits and Reserves for L. & D. 
Add - Estimated appreciation 
Market value of assets not shown on books 
Dcduct - Lasses and depreciation 
adjusted net undivided profits 
Surplus impairment - deficit 




RISAPITULATION OF ALL CRITICISED ASSETS 
(Per cent to Capital and Surplus 1*) 
Doubtful (Per cent to Capital and Surplus %) 
Losses (Per cent to Capital and Surplus %) 
1 
wmjl^m II 1,11. REMARKS 
CHARACTER OF MAHAGELENT 
VIOLATIONS OF FEDERAL RESERVE ACT, REGULATIONS OR CONDITIONS OF MEMBERSHIP 
SUML1ARY OF EXAMINER'S CRITICISMS AND REMARKS 
^L^aHajqJLS 
DOES THE EXAMINATION REVEAL A CONDITION THAT WOULD WARRANT THE FEDERAL RESERVE 
BOARD TAKING ACTION TO DISCONTINUE THE MEMBERSHIP OF THIS BANK? 
PLEASE STATE WHETHER THE CONCLUSION IS CONCURRED IN LY ANY OR ALL OF THE FOLLOWING 
(a) Federal Reserve Agent and Governor, 
(b y Executive Committee , 
iv ^Cc) Board of Directors, 
V 
Federal Reserve Agent . 
NOTE; When a report of examination indicates a bank to be in an unsatisfacton^ 
ondition please furnish in detail such additional information as will permit the^p 
oard to intelligently consider the recommendations submitted* Arthur J. Rolnick 
Bank Rates and Risk 
Appendix B 
Sample Banks: State-Chartered Federal Reserve Member Banks in New York City Examined in 1926-30 
Month and Year of Examination Report 
Feb. 1926- May 1928- May 1929 
Name of Bank  Apr. 1928  Apr. 1929  Nov. 1930 
Amalgamated Bank  Jan. 1928  Feb. 1929  July 1930 
American Exchange Irving Trust Company  Nov. 1927  Sept. 1928  — 
American Trust Company  Oct. 1927  Oct. 1928  May 1929 
American Union Bank (0.835)*  Nov. 1926  Aug. 1928  July 1930 
Bank of America  Sept. 1927  —  — 
Bank of Europe (0.808)*  Aug. 1927  Feb. 1929  Oct. 1929 
Bank of New York and Trust Company  July 1926  Dec. 1928  Dec. 1929 
Bank of the Manhattan Company  Feb. 1926  —  July 1929 
Bank of United States (0.791)*  Nov. 1927  Nov. 1928  June 1929 
Bank of Yorktown  Aug. 1927  Jan. 1929  Oct. 1929 
Bankers Trust Company  Aug. 1927  —  — 
Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company**  —  —  Sept. 1929 
Central Mercantile Bank  May 1926  —  — 
Central Union Trust Company**  Feb. 1927  Jan. 1929  — 
Chemical National Bank  —  —  May 1930 
Commonwealth Bank  May 1927  —  — 
Continental Bank of New York  July 1927  Jan. 1929  Dec. 1929 
Corn Exchange Bank  Nov. 1926  Nov. 1928  Nov. 1929 
Farmers Loan and Trust Company  Feb. 1928  Feb. 1929  — 
Federation Bank of New York  Feb. 1927  Mar. 1929  Mar. 1930 
Fidelity Trust Company of New York  Mar. 1927  Nov. 1928  Dec. 1929 
Fifth Avenue Bank  July 1927  Nov. 1928  Apr. 1930 
Fulton Trust Company  Mar. 1927  Mar. 1929  Mar. 1930 
Guaranty Trust Company of New York  Oct. 1926  —  Apr. 1930 
Harbor State Bank  —  —  Oct. 1930 
International Acceptance Securities and Trust Company  Sept. 1926  Nov. 1928  — 
International Germanic Trust Company  Apr. 1928  Sept. 1928  Jan. 1930 
International-Madison and Trust Company (0.834)*  —  —  Aug. 1930 
International Union Bank  Mar. 1927  —  — 
International Union Bank and Trust Company  July 1926  June 1928  — 
Interstate Trust Company  Apr. 1927  Dec. 1928  — 
Longacre Bank  Feb. 1927  —  — 
Manufacturers Trust Company  Dec. 1926  —  Mar. 1930 
Merchants Bank  —  Aug. 1928  July 1930 
Murray Hill Trust Company of New York  Aug. 1927  Aug. 1928  — 
Mutual Bank  Jan. 1927  —  — 
New Netherlands Bank  Dec. 1926  —  — 
New York Trust Company  Aug. 1926  —  — 
Pacific Coast Trust Company  Sept. 1927  Aug. 1928  — 
Park Row Trust Company  —  —  July 1930 
Plaza Trust Company  —  —  July 1930 
Standard Bank  Apr. 1927  —  — 
Times Square Trust Company (0.921)*  Sept. 1927  July 1928  Mar. 1930 
Trade Bank of New York  Mar. 1927  Aug. 1928  July 1930 
United States Mortgage and Trust Company  July 1927  May 1928  — 
United States Trust Company of New York  Apr. 1927  Dec. 1928  Sept. 1930 
Number of banks examined  39  27  27 
*This bank eventually failed (with the indicated rate ot return to creditors as of 1937). 
"On May 15,1929, the Central Union Trust Company became the Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company. 
Source: Polk's Bankers Encyclopedia (selected issues), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
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